Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) provide state-of-the-art results for most machine learning and computer vision tasks. However, they have been found susceptible to adversarial examples. In the recent literature, many ways of generating adversarial examples have been discovered. In this work, we propose a novel method to generate adversarial examples with generative adversarial networks (GANs). Compared to traditional optimisation-based methods, our method provides a fast yet powerful alternative for adversary generation. Unlike other GAN-based approaches in the literature which learn to generate an intermediate perturbation vector, our method generates adversarial examples from benign input images in a straightforward manner. By directly generating adversarial examples from given input images, our method produces perturbations that better align with the underlying edge and shape contained in the inputs, hence more natural-looking and imperceptible to human eyes. We evaluate our method on the MNIST and the CIFAR-10 dataset and demonstrate that it outperforms the state-of-the-art GAN-based attack AdvGAN with similar attack capability in terms of distortion. We show that our method produces competitive results to notable optimisation-based attacks in the literature including the strongest Carlini & Wagner (CW) attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have drastically altered the machine learning landscape by achieving state-of-the-art performance on a wide variety of pattern recognition tasks ranging from speech processing [18] , [60] and computer vision [19] , [51] , [77] to bioinformatics [35] . Specifically, in the image recognition domain DNNs have approached or even outperformed human accuracy on many computer vision tasks [11] , [19] , [51] , [76] . However, recent research has shown that DNN models are not as robust as people may have perceived -they are in fact highly vulnerable to adversarial examples. This intriguing phenomenon was first discovered in [54] , which proved that carefully crafted inputs, while largely imperceptible to human eyes, can easily deceive the best-performing DNN classifiers, forcing them to give erroneous classification outputs. Even worse, models under such attacks can occasionally report wrong outcomes with high confidence. More surprisingly, [54] found that such attacks are easily generalised and transferable to other DNN The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Min Jia . models. One adversarial example is demonstrated in Fig.1 , where a perturbed image of a giant panda is classified by a VGG-16 network [51] as a black bear.
These intriguing findings have sparked tremendous interests of researchers in adversarial attacks and possible defenses against these attacks. While [54] speculated that the cause of these behaviours is the extreme non-linearity of DNN models, a later research claimed that they are in fact due to the high linearity of DNNs in the high-dimensional space [16] . This has largely remained to be an open question and more convincing explanations are yet to be surfaced.
DNNs have been widely employed in a wide range of applications such as autonomous control for robots and vehicles [6] , [12] , financial forecasting and prediction [1] , [10] , medical treatments [29] , [46] , information security [55] , [69] , and human-computer interactions [57] . Notably, DNNs have also become powerful analytic tools in the era of the Internet of Things (IoT), whereby enormous amount of data are collected and processed, in an intelligent way, from noisy and complex environment. Wireless networks, especially the IoT-based Fifth Generation (5G) networks [26] , [27] , require high data rates, low latency, efficient spectrum usage and coexistence VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ FIGURE 1. An adversarial example generated by the FGSM attack [16] on the VGG-16 network [51] . Left: the clean input image correctly classified as a class of giant panda by VGG-16. Middle: visualisation of the perturbation added (magnified by 100 times). Right: the perturbed image which is erroneously classified by the same network as a American black bear.
of distinct network technologies, thus demanding the incorporation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and DNN-driven techniques to extract patterns and make sense of the data to prescribe action to the end devices. Given the ubiquitous deployment of AI-and DNN-driven technologies in every aspect of daily life, there exist huge incentives to increase the security of any DNN-based technology and to defend against possible malicious attacks. The problem on adversarial examples has become a highly active arena in recent years that has drawn tremendous attention and efforts from both academia and industry.
Most existing attack algorithms [7] , [37] , [41] , [54] rely on optimisation schemes with pixel-wise L p metrics. A majority of these methods [7] , [16] , [37] , [41] , [54] explicitly compute a perturbation vector in order to generate the adversarial example. As an alternative to optimisation-based methods, in this work we propose to train a generative adversarial network (GAN) to learn the mapping from a benign input image to an adversarial sample. Instead of obtaining an intermediate perturbation vector, we train the GAN to directly generate the perturbed image as the output.
In many previous work [7] , [16] , [37] , the attack methods require full access to the architecture and model parameters of the target network to produce adversarial examples (thus white-box attacks). Our method does not require any access to the target model during test time, as we only query the target model during training. Hence, our method is a semi-white box attack [64] , [72] and is more powerful than previous white-box attacks. The contributions of our work include: 1) We propose a novel GAN architecture to directly generate adversarial examples from benign images in one shot, that is, without computing any intermediate perturbation vectors. We show that our proposed architecture yields competitive results to existing approaches including the state-of-the-art CW attack [7] . 2) We evaluate our method and AdvGAN [64] on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets in terms of rigorous and comprehensive evaluation metrics which most previous work on GAN-based attacks failed to provide. 3) We report results (of our method and AdvGAN) under untargeted attack setting. GAN-based approaches in the literature are mostly implemented and reported under the targeted setting.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section II, we briefly explain the concepts of adversarial learning, common similarity metrics, GANs as well as selected attack algorithms in the current literature. In Section III, we formally introduce our method and choices of architecture and objective function. In Section IV, we outline our experimental set-ups covering the dataset, model parameters and evaluation methods used. Comprehensive evaluations of our proposed method are conducted against existing attacks in Section V. In Section VI, we provide further insights on our method and experimental outcomes, and finally, we summarise our work with a brief conclusion in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND A. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Adversarial perturbations are small, carefully crafted vectors added to the pixels in a legitimate image to cause a classifier to give wrong predictions [54] . The perturbed examples are named adversarial examples. We give the terms adversarial attack to a process that generates adversarial examples to deceive a classifier, and defense to any countermeasure that deploys algorithms to mitigate adversarial attacks. Since its discovery, adversarial perturbation has been extended to other domains: from malware detection [32] , [53] and image segmentation [13] , [34] to visual question answer [50] and image caption [8] . However, in this work we solely concern with its relevance to the 2D image classification problem.
A neural network can be considered as a highly non-linear function F(x) = y that maps an input x ∈ R n to an output y ∈ R m , where n is the dimension of the input and m is the number of classes. At the end of the network, a softmax function is used to ensure the output vector y becomes a probability distribution satisfying 0 ≤ y i ≤ 1 and y 1 + . . . + y m = 1. We denote the classifier as C(x) = arg max i F(x) i . Moreover, we use x to explicitly denote the legitimate input and x the perturbed input. We denote the ground-truth label by l and the false label by l . l = C(x) and l = C(x ). These notations will be consistent throughout this paper.
The aim of an adversarial attack is to construct an adversarial sample x = x + δ x where δ x is a small amount of perturbation to be added to the raw input. The significance of perturbation can be rigorously measured by a distance (or similarity) metric: D(x, x ) (see next section). x is expected to give rise to a different output vector y resulting in an incorrect output classification l . We now formally formulate the objective of adversarial attack as follows:
where the first constraint imposes the fooling objective and the second constraint ensures the perturbed image x is a valid image. Solving this optimisation problem is non-trivial due to the non-linear and non-convex properties of DNN models [54] .
B. SIMILARITY METRICS
Similarity metrics provide quantitative measures of the visual quality of generated images by comparing with a source image. They are essential objectives to achieve for adversarial attacks which demand minimal perceptual distortion. In our work we use L p distance, the most widely-used distance metrics in the literature of adversarial learning, as well as Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) [63] as our similarity metrics. L p distance Provided that we wish the crafted input x to be as similar to x as possible, a distance metric quantifies the similarity (or distance) between x and x . The L p distance is defined as:
We consider the mostly used L 0 , L 1 , L 2 and L ∞ distances [68] , each of which has a significant physical interpretation: 1) L 0 counts the number of non-zero elements in the vector v. In the context of image perturbation, it measures the number of pixels that have been altered as a consequence of the perturbation. 2) L 1 gives the sum of the absolute values of all elements in v. It is the total amount of alteration made on the source image. 3) L 2 is the standard Euclidean distance between x and x .
In other words, L 2 distance is the root mean-squared (RMS) distance between x and x . 4) L ∞ indicates the maximum element in v. Equivalently, it measures the largest pixel-wise alteration among all pixels. We can view the L ∞ distance as a maximum budget: each pixel is at most altered by this amount. PSNR The PSNR metric is derived from the mean-squared error (MSE) between two images:
where MAX is maximum possible pixel value of the image. 1 However, PSNR is generally a less ideal metric in reflecting the distortion perceived by human eyes [21] , [22] . Nonetheless, we consider it as it has been extensively used to analyse distortion in the literature. SSIM The SSIM metric is defined as:
1 The PSNR considers the maximum squared intensity of the signal (thus related to the peak dynamic range), whereas the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) concerns the averaged signal.
where µ x and µ y are the mean of x and y. σ 2
x and σ 2 y are the variance of x and y. σ xy is the covariance of x and y. C 1 and C 2 are two variables stabilising the division with weak denominator. The maximum value of SSIM is 1, indicating maximal structural similarity between two images. SSIM is 0 when no structural similarity exists between them.
There exist other similarity metrics such as the Perceptual Image Difference [66] , Universal Quality Index [62] and Perceptual Loss [28] but they are yet to be adopted in the adversarial learning literature. Rozsa et al. proposed the perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS) [47] for adversarial examples, which has drawn less attention. Recently, Jang et al. [25] suggested new ways to assess adversarial example similarity by evaluating how much they corrupt the Fourier Transform, their effects on edges and images' gradients. Yet, further validation on the metric is required. As such, in our work we do not adopt these metrics.
It shall be noted that similarity metrics are not only essential tools for quality assessment, they are also fundamental in the formulation of most attack algorithms. Some attacks use L 0 to minimise the number of pixels perturbed [7] , [41] , some use L 2 to minimise the Euclidean distance between x and x [7] , [54] while some others choose L ∞ to minimise the maximum change applied to any pixel [7] , [16] .
C. GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS
Generative models are models that are capable of learning a mapping between an input of certain distribution and an output following a target distribution. In recent years, generative adversarial networks (GANs) have become arguably the most powerful generative models, achieving state-of-the-art results on a wide variety of image generation [5] , [17] , [45] and manipulation [74] problems.
GANs [15] comprise two neural network models: a generator D and a discriminator D, competing with each other in a min-max game. The goal of G is to learn the distribution p g over data x so that it can produce synthetic samples that are as real as possible. G samples an input variable z from a uniform or Gaussian distribution p z (z) and learns to map it to the data space G(z) through a differential network. The target of D is a classifier that learns to distinguish a synthetic sample from a real sample. During training, both G and D compete with each other and gradually improve performance over their respective tasks. The objective function for GAN can be formulated as:
represents the probability that x comes from the real data rather than the generator's distribution p g .
Despite great success, GANs are well-known for their training instability such as extreme sensitivity of network structure and parameter tuning [14] , [48] . Training instability produces two major problems: vanishing gradient [4] , [17] and mode collapse [2] , [4] , [14] , [48] . Vanishing gradient is when p data and p model are completely disjoint such that the discriminator perfectly separates real and synthesised data. Mode collapse happens when generator repeatedly produces the same or similar output to easily fool the discriminator [4] . In both situations the GAN is prevented from learning p data . Improvements have been proposed to tackle the instability by modifying the objective function in the original work, such as the WGAN [3] , WGAN-GP [17] and the LSGAN [33] .
The traditional GANs also do not have explicit control over the generated data. In other words, the data is generated in an unsupervised manner and its class is completely random. Mehdi et al. introduced conditional GAN [36] where the class information is embedded in the training to generate outputs of predictable class. Following their work, infoGAN [9] and ACGAN [39] also control the output of the GAN with more complex structures.
D. ATTACK ALGORITHMS
In this section, we review some of the most significant attack algorithms in the literature including FGSM, Deep-Fool, CW and AdvGAN. These attacks have received the largest amount of attention from the research community and are the most studied methods by recent works. Remarkably, the FGSM has been the most simplistic and fastest attack algorithm, whereas CW represents the most powerful, stateof-the-art attack methodology. We will later on compare our proposed method with these selected attacks from various aspects to assess their pros and cons.
1) FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD (FGSM)
The FGSM attack [16] adds a perturbation for each pixel in the direction of decreasing gradient of the loss function:
where t is the target label. The FGSM is a quick, one-step attack which simply uses the sign of the gradient and an arbitrary perturbation magnitude to devise the perturbation.
2) DeepFool
DeepFool [37] is an untargeted attack optimised for the L 2 metric. It assumes that an image resides in a region that is confined by the decision boundaries of the classifier. At each iteration, the algorithm perturbs the image by a small vector that is computed to bring the resulting image towards the decision boundary of the polyhedron that is closest to x in the image space. In two-dimensional space, the boundary would be a straight line, and the shortest distance to move x across that boundary can be found by the projection distance from x to the boundary. However, in the high-dimensional and non-linear image space, finding the required movement becomes non-trivial. DeepFool uses a linearised approximation of the boundary to iteratively solve the problem. In each iteration, a step (perturbation) is made in the direction to the linearised boundary and the perturbations in each iteration are accumulated to produce the final perturbation once the resulting image crosses the original decision boundary.
3) CARLINI-WAGNER (CW) ATTACK
Implemented under the L 0 , L 2 and L ∞ norm, the CW Attack [7] is the strongest attack in the literature [40] , [44] , [61] . It is based on L-BFGS [54] and can be targeted or untargeted. We select the CW attack under L 2 norm for investigation as it has shown to give the best results. The L 2 CW attack re-formulates the original objective function of adversarial attack into the following form that is better suited for optimisation:
Some possible choices of f proposed in their work include:
where loss F,t (x) is the cross-entropy loss for x, (e) + denotes max(e, 0), and Z (x) denotes the logits (the penultimate layer of F before the very last softmax layer). Empirically, f 5 (x ) is selected as f to give the best results. 3 Unlike [54] which uses L-BFGS to tackle box-constrained optimisation, [7] considers three alternative methods of approaching the problem: 1) projected gradient descent, 2) clipped gradient descent and 3) change of variables. For the L 2 CW attack, the change of variables method is empirically selected. It introduces a new variable w and, instead of optimising over x − x , they set
and optimise over w. Given the range of tanh function, the box-constrain x ∈ [0, 1] n is inherently valid. Eventually, the optimisation to be solved becomes
4) AdvGAN
To the best of our knowledge, AdvGAN [64] is the first ever work that leverages GAN to generate adversarial examples, and has been the state-of-the-art GAN-based attack. They employ a GAN network to learn a mapping from a 2 The original work implements the attack as a targeted attack. However, it can be modified as an untargeted attack as will be explained in Section III. 3 In the actual implementation, they used
where κ is a hyper-parameter to control the confidence level of producing adversarial examples that can successfully fool the classifier. The higher κ, the stronger the adversarial examples. Hence, a trade-off is to be made between the perturbation distance and the confidence. ground-truth input image x to a perturbation map G(x), which is overlayed on top of the input image to obtain the adversary x = x + G(x). To achieve the fooling objective, they also query the generated adversaries to the target model. In order to generate adversaries that are similar to the input images, they also use the L 2 distance between x and x as a loss. Finally, their GAN objective function can be formulated as:
where parameters α and β control the relative weights of the terms. They chose the LSGAN [33] loss for L AdvGAN as it has shown to stabilise training and result in better image quality. They adopt the best performing loss function from [7] for L adv . The perturbation loss is defined as
where c is an arbitrary constant. Refer to Fig.20 in Appendix for the AdvGAN architecture.
III. OUR METHOD
Most existing attacks [7] , [16] , [37] , [41] , [54] require the explicit computation of a perturbation vector and superimpose it on the original input. A natural question that arises is: can we directly produce the adversaries without any intermediate perturbation vectors? The recent progress in the imageto-image translation literature seems to grant feasibility to this novel idea. However, what could be the potential advantage of such one-step generation of adversaries? Indeed, obtaining an additive perturbation vector seems most intuitive given the objective of an adversarial attack -we want to make small perturbations to the input image to fool a classifier and hence we try to compute such perturbations and enforce them onto raw images. Computing an intermediate perturbation vector also allows explicit control over the amount of perturbations made and we at least have some form of supervision on the quality of our adversaries.
Our work shows that constructing adversaries directly from benign images is a viable configuration given the recent success of image-to-image translation networks [24] , [70] , [75] . Moreover, the configuration of learning to reconstruct the raw image and to achieve adversarial objective simultaneously can lead to implicitly made perturbations that contain strong semantic information which improves the perceptual realism of the adversaries.
Moreover, most existing attacks involve large iterations of optimisation procedures at inference time in order to produce adversarial samples of decent quality. By leveraging generative models for adversarial generation, one only needs to train the GAN model once and, at inference time, uses the pre-trained generator to obtain adversaries instantly and indefinitely. We will also demonstrate that generative model-based approaches have much higher inference speed than existing attacks. In this section, we formally describe our proposed method.
A. ARCHITECTURE
Our proposed architecture is presented in Fig.2 . In addition to the traditional GAN structure (composed of a generator and a discriminator), we query the target model with generated adversaries during training to fulfill the adversarial objective. We also utilise an auxiliary classifier that predicts the class of generated images.
1) IMAGE-TO-IMAGE TRANSLATION GAN
We adopt an image-to-image translation architecture similar to the one in the Pix2Pix network [24] . It shall be noted that, by directly feeding the benign image as the input to the generator without noise z, the network learns a mapping from x to x with deterministic outputs [24] . To resolve this, many works use both x and noise z as the input, whereas [24] provides the noise only in the form of dropout applied on several layers of the generator at both training and test time (and despite the noise, they only observed minor stochasticity in the outputs). For adversarial attack, the stochasticity in the adversarial examples is not a relevant criteria to be met, hence we do not include randomness in our network. However, to produce slightly varied adversarial outputs for a given input image, stochasiticity can be easily introduced by dropout layers in the generator at both training and inference time [24] .
2) AUXILIARY CLASSIFIER Following [39] , we directly obtain the penultimate layer output of the discriminator as the classifier, that is, we do not implement a separate classifier. Concretely, we obtain a copy of flatten (penultimate) layer output and map into 10-class logits (via a fully-connected layer) followed by the softmax activation. The auxiliary classifier is designated to predict the class labels for both real and adversarial images. The label of an adversary is assigned as that of the benign image from which the adversary is generated.
3) DISTANCE BETWEEN INPUT AND OUTPUT
It is crucial to compute the distance between x and x , using it as a loss to encourage proximity (similarity) between the original and adversarial images. The objective functions are discussed in the next section.
4) RUNTIME SET-UP
At run-time, the trained generator is directly used as an adversary generator with the benign image supplied as the input (shown in Fig.3 ). Unlike optimisation-based methods which require access to the target model at test time, our run-time generation of adversaries is a completely standalone process as knowledge on the target model has been embedded in the trained generator during training. Our method is therefore a more powerful, semi-white box attack [64] , [72] than other white box attacks.
Our proposed architecture differs from existing adversary generation methods in the following ways:
1) Most existing attacks, including optimisation-based [7] , [16] , [31] , [37] , [41] , [54] , [56] and generativemodel-based [64] algorithms, compute an intermediate perturbation vector and overlay it onto the original image. We describe these methods as perturbationbased methods. Our proposed method, on the contrary, does not require an intermediate vector but directly obtain the adversary from the generator, hence the name one-shot.
2) The only efforts in the literature that compute adversaries directly from the generator are [52] and [20] . However, we stress that both work adopt different architectures from ours. Both [52] and [20] and use noise and class label to drive the generator, whereas our work adopts an image-to-image translation structure and uses images themselves as inputs.
B. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 1) GAN LOSS
For our network we considered the binary cross-entropy (i.e. the sigmoid cross loss) [15] , [24] , [30] , [45] and the least-square [33] , [75] objective functions from recent literature. We chose the least-square loss as it resulted in more stable training and higher quality outputs. When using least-square loss, we do not apply sigmoid activation at the end of G(x). Mathematically, for the least-square loss we train the generator to minimize
and the discriminator to minimise
To achieve the goal of fooling a target pre-trained classifier, we define the adversarial loss L adv as:
where l is any class that is different the ground-truth label of x, l. f loss is any appropriate loss function such as the cross entropy loss. We propose to use the optimal CW loss function defined in [7] , that is:
where Z (x) denotes the logits from the target model. t is the targeted label as originally defined in [7] for the targeted attack. Hence, this loss function aims to minimise the difference between the predicted scores of target class and the most significant non-target class (i.e. the ground-truth class), therefore encouraging higher scores for the target class and lower scores for the predominant (ground-truth) class. (e) + denotes max(e, 0). It is to discourage the score of the target class to surpass that of the ground-truth class. The rationale behind it is that ideally we want the perturbation to push the sample to marginally across the decision boundary [7] , [37] . This causes the classifier to produce a wrong prediction and meanwhile maximally retain the original features of the benign input. As the sample is pushed further cross the decision boundary, we obtain the same false prediction with higher confidence, albeit at the cost of greater distortion to the original image. (see Fig.4 for illustration.) To gain control over the confidence (and also the adversarial capability), we introduce a parameter κ [7] to formulate f loss (x ) as:
κ denotes the margin by which we allow the logit of the target class to be higher than that of the ground-truth class. The larger κ, the further the adversary is across the decision boundary, and hence the greater confidence in fooling the target classifier. Now, we need to modify the CW loss function for our untargeted attack setting. Instead of minimising the difference between scores of the target class and the groundtruth, we minimise the difference between scores of the ground-truth class and of the class with the largest scores among the rest of the classes. Hence, our untargeted CW loss function is formulated as:
This loss function encourages lower logit of the ground-truth class and higher logit of the most likely class among the rest of the classes (i.e. the easiest false class).
3) PERTURBATION LOSS
Previous work [43] on GAN training have proven beneficial to incorporate traditional L p distance as a loss, to encourage generated images to be close to the ground truth. As such, we define a loss term that measures the distance between them:
where p is the order of norm. Usual choices of p are [1, 2, ∞]. However, it is known that L 1 and L 2 norm generates blurry images, as they fail to encourage high frequency crispness. In many cases, they nonetheless accurately capture the low frequencies. [24] uses L 1 over L 2 as the former encourages less blurring. Empirically we found that using a weighted sum of L 1 and L 2 loss in practice lead to better perceptual quality. Hence, we use
for our work, where λ 1 and λ 2 control the significance of each term. We arbitrarily enforce λ 1 + λ 2 = 1 to facilitate parameter tuning. We also considered to incorporate the SSIM metric into L pert as pointed out in [49] but it did not lead to significant improvement in image quality.
4) AUXILIARY CLASSIFICATION LOSS
Last but not least, we postulate that our attack configuration has a more strict requirement on the output image quality as compared to other GAN-based attacks such as the Adv-GAN [64] . This is because we directly generate the adversarial example from the generator whereas the AdvGAN only generates the perturbation map and adds it back to the ground-truth image: x = x + G(x). Under their configuration, the visual quality of the output is guaranteed by the ground-truth image x which forms the basis of their output adversary. Moreover, the AdvGAN can manually lower the magnitude of the perturbation map G(x), by a convenient clipping operation, to ensure x remains as close as the x.
To this end, we use an auxiliary classifier and a classification loss L aux , as suggested in [39] , to encourage the generator to produce better quality samples. The classification probabilities are nothing but the flatten layer output from the discriminator model passed through an FC(10) and an softmax layers. We take the cross entropy (CE) loss as L aux rather than the negative log-likelihood (NLL) loss used in the original work [39] . Finally, our full objective is given by:
where α, β, γ and λ control the relative importance of respective loss terms.
IV. EXPERIMENT SET-UP A. DATASET 1) MNIST
It consists of 70,000 handwritten digits from 0 to 9, 60,000 for training and 10,000 for testing. We further divide the test set into a test set and a validation set of 5,000 samples each. Each image contains 28 × 28 pixels with each pixel taking an intensity value between 0 and 255.
2) CIFAR-10
It contains 60,000 images of objects belonging to 10 classes. Images are of dimension 32 × 32 × 3 with pixel values in between 0 and 255. The dataset is partitioned into 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images. We further split the test set into 5,000 validation data and 5,000 test data.
B. MODELS 1) TRANSLATION NETWORK
Our image-to-image translation network roughly follows the one used in [28] for style transfer. We avoid pooling in generator and discriminator but instead use strided convolutions to perform downsampling. For upsampling operations in the generator we use upsampling followed by convolution rather than transposed convolution to avoid potential artifacts [38] . The generator comprises four concatenated residual blocks [19] each having the architecture outlined in Fig.5 . Each non-residual convolution layer in the generator is followed by batch normalisation (BN) and ReLU activation function, expect for the last one which is only followed by a BN layer. All convolution layers in the generator use 3 × 3 kernels The discriminator architecture largely follows the one in [45] . Each convolution is followed by Leaky ReLU activation. We use BN immediately after each convolution layer except for the first one. All convolution layers in the discriminator adopt 4 × 4 kernels. By default, we use batch normalisation [23] in both the generator and discriminator architectures, but also consider instance normalisation [58] which produced visually better results in a number of work [65] , [75] . 4 
2) INPUT AND OUTPUT
The input and output of the proposed network is a 1×28×28 MNIST image or a 3 × 28 × 28 CIFAR-10 image. We normalise the MNIST data to [0, 1] and the CIFAR-10 data to [−1, 1] as empirically they yield better results.
3) RESIDUAL BLOCKS
Residual blocks in the generator architecture are essential in improving the effectiveness of our translation network. Residual blocks are proposed in [19] where they are used in image classification deep neural networks. [19] shows that residual connections in residual blocks make the identify function more easily learned, which is a desirable property for image-to-image translation task where the output is expected to share structure with the input. This is even more relevant in our task of generating minimally distorted adversarial outputs.
4) TARGET NETWORK
We adopt the target classifier for MNIST data defined in [42] and [7] . The model details are provided in Table 1 . Refer to Appendix for explanations on the terms and notations used to describe network architectures in this section. For CIFAR-10 data, we train a ResNet18 classifier whose architecture is given in Table 1 .
C. IMPLEMENTATION
Our work is implemented entirely in PyTorch. All network architectures and loss functions are conveniently built with PyTorh functions, with the exception of the CW loss function for which we used self-written code. The training settings of both target classifiers for MNSIT and CIFAR-10 data are summarised in Table 2 . The final classification accuracy are 99.2% (MNIST) and 93.7% (CIFAR-10) respectively. The training algorithm of our proposed GAN is summarised in Algorithm 1. All experiments are run on an NVIDIA GeFORCE GTX 1070 GPU. (T (x , l) ) 9 g loss ← l g + l pert + l adv The attack success rate (ASR) is the percentage of crafted examples that successfully achieve the adversarial objective against a target classifier. It is the most important and straightforward evaluation criteria which explicitly manifests how effective the attack is in deceiving the target model. As already defined in Section II-A for targeted attacks, the attack success rate is the percentage of perturbed images that enforce the classifier to predict the arbitrarily-defined target labels. In this work we only consider attacks under the untargeted configuration, for which the attack success rate is simply the percentage of perturbed images that cause the target classifier to give wrong predictions.
2) PERCEPTUAL SIMILARITY
We propose to quantify the extent of similarity with existing visual similarity metrics, namely L p distance (p = [0, 1, 2, ∞]), PSNR and SSIM [63] (see definitions in Section II-B). Among them, SSIM is arguably the best at capturing human perceptible distortion [49] . However, there are no optimal similarity metrics that perfectly align with human perception and a complementary human perceptual study is often necessary. To this end, some previous work [41] , [64] , [71] carried out human detection studies of various formats. We also design a human detection experiment to evaluate the visual quality of generated adversaries as perceived by human vision.
3) ATTACK SPEED
The speed of adversary generation is another important aspect and is an significant consideration in real-life applications. We evaluate the attack speed by the average amount of time required to generate one adversarial example at inference time.
V. EVALUATIONS A. VISUAL QUALITY
In this section, we evaluate the visual quality of the adversaries by inspecting the generated samples and the perturbation maps. For fair comparisons, we ensure that adversaries generated by all samples correspond to an attack success rate of approximately 89% on the test set. 5 Fig.6 compares the adversarial samples and perturbation maps by our method and AdvGAN.
We observe that adversarial examples by our method are visually highly similar to the ground-truth samples. The perturbation vectors largely follow the ground-truth shapes of digits in respective source images. The background region is left mostly unaltered. Consequently, our adversaries are maximally similar to their respective ground-truth counterparts. In sheer contrast, AdvGAN makes significant perturbations in the entire image space, both in the background and on top of the strokes of the digits, significantly degrading the adversaries' quality. Similar perturbation patterns are observed in adversaries by FGSM, shown in Fig.7 . DeepFool and CW attacks both introduce blurs around the digits despite less 5 Due to limited attack capability of FGSM, we choose an attack success rate of 72% as the image becomes human-unreadable beyond this figure. We argue that FGSM does not lead to better visual quality even with much lower attack success rate. Similarly, we choose ASR of 84.5% as it is the closest we can get due to the way the algorithm is configured. [16] , DeepFool [37] and CW [7] . For each method we show the ground-truth images in the top row, the perturbation magnitude maps in the middle, and the resultant adversaries at the bottom. Pixel values are normalised to [0, 255] to indicate magnitude. noise in the background region, hence inferior visual quality compared to ours.
We also consider the directions in which pixels are altered. From Fig. 8 , FGSM and AdvGAN tend to diminish pixel values at the strokes' locations, weakening the underlying shape information, while encouraging noisy background with increased pixel values. DeepFool and CW attacks also make perceptible alterations to the background while reducing the stroke-containing pixels, both to a less extent. In comparison, our method adds perturbations at very limited pixel locations along strokes' edges, whilst making almost no change to background region. Hence, it is evident that our method generates adversaries with the best visual quality.
To summarise, our method produces perturbations with stronger semantic information. The perturbations are made in a highly constrained way such that most perturbations are along the edges present in the raw image. Consequently, the added perturbations are minimally intrusive and the generated adversaries maximally resemble the raw images.
For CIFAR-10 images (shown in Fig.9 ), AdvGAN seems to produce much smaller perturbations at first glance. We will demonstrate in Section II-B that visual judgement can be deceptive and AdvGAN in fact produces larger perturbations than our method. It is noted that adversaries by both AdvGAN and our method contain grid-like noise (tiling or checkerboard artifacts) throughout the entire image space. The artifacts of our method are less perceptible than those of AdvGAN. In spite of less tiling artifacts, adversaries by our method are more blurry than the AdvGAN adversaries due to the reconstruction process in our method, as opposed to AdvGAN which overlays noise on top of original images.
Last but not least, perturbations by our method reflect stronger semantic information, as seen from the shape and colour patterns in the perturbation maps. Once again, by learning perturbations through the reconstruction process, the GAN becomes more capable of producing perturbations semantically align with features in the benign images, thereby making the perturbation more natural as perceived by human eyes. For example, in Fig.9 our method perturbs the ''horse'' image by altering the colour of the horse rider and perturbs the ''ship'' image by modifying mainly the hull part of the ship. We argue that the main advantage of the semantically strong perturbations lies in that adversarial objective can be achieved by altering the colour of certain objects or parts of objects in the benign images, rather than compromising the shape information by adding intrusive and pervasive noise. Despite being somewhat blurry, adversaries produced by our method beat their AdvGAN counterparts in human perceptual study.
In comparison, FGSM alters the inputs by the greatest amount (see Fig.10 ) and perturbations appear to be largely random. DeeoFool, on the other hand, produces the minimal perturbations which exhibit slightly observable patterns. CW attack produces larger perturbations than DeepFool. Its perturbations are very similar to those by our method in terms of semantic information (i.e. shape and colour) albeit with a smaller magnitude on average.
To sum up, we verified that FGSM produces the worse-quality adversaries that are largely contaminated by random-appearing noise. AdvGAN introduces severe tiling artifacts but is able to preserve the sharpness of the underlying content. Adversaries by our method have less artifacts compared to AdvGAN but appear slightly blurry. DeepFool and CW attacks produce the best adversaries in terms of sharpness of content and imperceptibility of noise with the smallest amount of alterations made.
B. DISTORTION ANALYSIS
To quantitatively analyse the visual quality of generated adversaries, we compute the average distortion between each adversary and its source based on the L p , SSIM and PSNR metrics (see Table 3 ). The results are computed over adversaries generated for the entire test set. The distortion of MNIST and CIFAR-10 images are presented in Table 3 and 4 respectively.
From Table 3 , our method has the smallest L 0 (number of pixels modified) and L 1 (sum of pixel-wise distortion) distortion among all algorithms. These corroborate with the visual quality as perceived by eyes earlier on. Our method produces relative small L 2 distortion. As our method makes perturbations in a more discriminative way, variance of pixel-wise perturbation is expected to be larger than the others. As such, it is expected that our method causes slightly larger L 2 distortion than DeepFool and CW, yet achieving greater imperceptibility. We argue that L ∞ distance does not necessarily coincide with the perceptual similarity. As observed in Fig.6 , the largest pixel-wise perturbations are added in a highly constrained manner. Such perturbations are fairly imperceptible to human eyes when added along the edges of strokes or in natural-looking patterns.
Our method is also best-performing in terms of SSIM as it preserves the structural similarity to the greatest extent by avoiding intrusive perturbation patterns throughout the entire image. It is slightly behind CW and DeepFool in terms of PSNR, outperforming AdvGAN and FGSM. This is expected given that PSNR is derived from the MSE loss which is related to the L 2 distance. To summarise, our distortion analysis corroborates our argument in Section V-A that our method produces MNIST adversaries of the greatest perceptual similarity compared to competing methods when evaluated on the same level of attack capability.
For CIFAR-10 images, DeepFool performs surprisingly well, achieving best results on almost all metrics. It is followed by CW and our method (see Table 4 ). These align with our earlier observations. Meanwhile, our method outperforms AdvGAN as can be deduced from key metrics such as L 1 distortion and the SSIM score. This is again verified by a visual inspection of Fig.9 . In short, our method outperforms the AdvGAN attack on the CIFAR-10 dataset, producing adversaries of competitive quality to the state-of-the-art.
Last but not least, we study the class-wise effectiveness of various methods where we compute the average distortion of adversaries for each individual class. The results show that our attack possesses no weakness towards any particular class, performing consistently well across all classes. In contrast, we observe that FGSM is weak against digit ''1'' images from the MNIST dataset. CW and DeepFool exhibit greater variance among different MNIST classes in terms of L ∞ and PSNR metrics. Even larger variance is observed for CW attack on the CIFAR-10 dataset, where the average L 0 distortion of class ''frog'' is almost twice that of class ''dog''.
C. DATA DISTRIBUTION
We are interested in the extent to which an attack method can retain the ground-truth distribution of the real samples. We expect the data distribution to be altered by any attack method in order for the crafted data to deceive a target model. However, an idea attack shall minimally alter the distribution of the real data to ensure visual realism of generated adversaries. Consider adding random noise to a benign image. When the magnitude of the added noise exceeds some threshold, the adversarial objective will always be achieved. But the adversary may simply become noise as the original image content is deeply buried in noise, and the data distribution will be largely destroyed. In other words, ideal adversaries should maximally retain the ground-truth distribution for maximal similarity.
We obtain the t-SNE [59] for the raw test set and adversarial examples generated on the test sets of both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets by various attack methods. 6 From Fig.13 7 we see that FGSM significantly contaminates the ground-truth distribution and most clusters (digits ''0'',''2'',''3'', ''4'', ''5'', ''6'', ''7'', ''8'', ''9'') shatter into broken pieces corroborating the visual quality observed in Fig.7 . DeepFool largely preserves the ground-truth distribution but two of its clusters are significantly broken (i.e. digits ''2'' and ''8''). CW, AdvGAN and our method appear to better preserve the data distribution, with only one class cluster significantly broken. However, comparing to all other attacks, our method results in the smallest extent of distortion of distribution across all classes (for instance, by observing the shapes of clusters of digits ''1'' and ''7''), confirming that our method generates adversarial samples of higher quality.
Another interesting observation made from Fig.13 is that our method shifts certain class clusters entirely to distinct spatial locations (e.g. digits ''2'' and ''3'') whilst preserving the integrity of these clusters. Based on our results in Fig.6 and Table 3 , we argue that such entire shifting of individual class distributions is favourable as we manage to push the features of certain classes closer to others' with minimal perturbations. The t-SNE is less effective in visualising the distribution of CIFAR-10 raw-pixel data. For completeness we include the results in Fig.22 in the Appendix.
D. SPEED AND EFFICIENCY
We clock the time taken for different attack algorithms to generate adversarial examples for all images in the test set (i.e. inference time). In Table 5 we compute the average amount of time required to generate a single adversary. The training time of GAN for GAN-based approaches is not considered as the pre-training of the generator is one-off and the trained generator can be used indefinitely. For GAN-based attacks, we do consider the time taken to load the pre-trained generator. Note that access to the target model is not required by GAN-based methods to compute adversaries examples. Other gradient-based and optimisation-based attacks all require accessing the target model at test time, therefore the time taken to load the target model is included.
As can be seen, our method (and also AdvGAN) outperforms others including FGSM. This manifests the speed advantage of GAN-based attacks over optimisation-based attack as the former only require a single forward propagation through the generator network for adversary generation. All experiments are run using the exact same setting as in Section V-A, and on a GTX1070 GPU. Our method has the fastest attack speed, closely followed by AdvGAN.
FIGURE 14.
Left: train sheet for human perceptual study. Right: a sample test sheet for our method, comprising 80 real images randomly selected from the MNIST test set and 20 adversarial images generated by our method.
In contrast, optimisation-based attacks involve large number of search steps at runtime and hence take much longer time.
The small margin between our method and AdvGAN can be accounted for by different complexity of generator models employed when running the tests. However, we also verify that our method remains faster than AdvGAN when using the exact same generator architectures. This is possibly due to the elimination of intermediate image processing steps, namely one pixel-wise addition operation and one pixel-wise clipping operation.
E. HUMAN DETECTION
We conduct human perceptual studies to evaluate the visual quality and realism of MNIST and CIFAR-10 adversaries generated as perceived by human eyes. Five participants are to identify fake (adversarial) images from a pool of images containing both genuine (benign) and synthetic (adversarial) images. Detailed evaluation schemes are as follows.
To begin with, we show each participant a Train Sheet of 100 real MNIST images randomly drawn from the MNIST training set (see Fig.14) , to provide participants with preliminary impression on the appearance of real MNIST examples.
Each candidate is then presented 5 Test Sheets, corresponding to the 5 attack methods investigated (i.e. FGSM, DeepFool, CW, AdvGAN and our method). Each Test Sheet contains 100 MNIST images, 80 of which are randomly sampled from the MNIST test set and the remaining 20 are adversaries generated by respective attack method. See Fig.14 identify this amount of images as their answer. Experiments are run for each candidate individually, and a maximum of 1 minute on each Test Sheet is allowed. All Test Sheets and their annotated solutions are shown in Fig.15 . We repeat the experiments for the CIFAR-10 images under exact same set-ups.
To summarise, each human candidate is made to observe a total of 500 images, 100 of which are adversarial. Each attack method generates 100 adversarial images to test all 5 human candidates. We compute the human detection success rate (DSR) by:
where n TP is the number of adversarial examples correctly identified (i.e. the number of True Positive (TP) results). Shown in Table 6 , our method generates MNIST adversaries perceptibly most similar to the real images, outperforming others by a considerable margin. From Fig.15 , competing methods generate easily differentiable samples due to significant amount of perturbation added to the entire image space. Human candidates can quickly identify and extract key characteristics of adversaries. For instance, all candidates noticed the streak-like patterns (in FGSM and AdvGAN adversaries) and blurry artifacts (in DeepFool and CW adversaries) in the background, which helped them quickly identify adversaries. In comparison, our method produces artifacts that resemble the shapes of handwritten digits and are not pervasive in the entire image space. It is an expected outcome that samples by our method are more capable of deceiving human eyes.
For CIFAR-10 experiments, our method significantly surpasses FGSM and AdvGAN but is outperformed by CW and DeepFool. Despite semantically strong perturbation patterns, our method results in more perceptible tiling artifacts as a consequence of GAN synthesis (so does AdvGAN). As such, our adversaries are slightly more differentiable than those by optimisation-based DeepFool and CW attacks. Such artifacts are subject to further suppression with more advanced GAN techniques and optimal training. Nevertheless, we prove that by directly generating adversaries from inputs, our method is able to inlay semantically stronger perturbations with the reduced amount of artifacts, resulting in less visually intrusive adversaries compared to AdvGAN.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we reflect on our training and evaluation outcomes and make some further comments and insights on our proposed method and our experimental results.
A. ONE-SHOT ADVERSARY GENERATION
The image-to-image translation adversary generation method introduced in this work is a novel architecture for adversarial attack. The usage of GAN to generate adversarial examples is a relatively unexploited area in the literature. To our best knowledge, the only work that adopt GAN for adversary generation are [52] , [64] , [67] , all of which were made very recently and are different from our proposed method. Concretely, we do not generate a separate perturbation vector, but encourage the GAN itself to explore the adversarial objective as it performs an image reconstruction task. In this way, the latent features learned by the GAN in reconstructing the input image is effectively re-utilised to compute the perturbation. This sharing of learned probability distribution enables the perturbation to align with the reconstructed image. Compared to other methods that search for effective perturbation in a largely uncontrolled way, our learned perturbation is in a highly restricted way. In fact, most of the pixels modified using our method reside on top of or within the close neighbourhood of the underlying shape present in the original image. As a result, our method perturbs the image in a way that is least visible by human eyes compared to most existing attacks that overlay a noise map throughout the entire image space.
B. TARGETED FORMULATION
One merit of our proposed method is that it can be readily formulated into an targeted attack, making it potentially a competitor in the arena of targeted attack. For the targeted attack implementation, we simply need to use the original CW loss formulation in [7] as the adversarial loss objective.
C. ABLATION OF MNIST ARTIFACTS
In the generation of MNIST adversaries we observed some more visually intrusive perturbation. We postulate that these artifacts are not signs of failed GAN training but rather essential alterations learned by the GAN to achieve the adversarial objective.
To verify our hypothesis, we conduct an ablation study for which we locate some of the most visible artifacts. We manually fix them by setting respective pixels to either 0 or 1 based on our knowledge of their benign counterparts. See Fig.16 for illustration. It is observed that simply changing one or two pixels at the artifact region would cause the target classifier to make the correct prediction. By modifying only 5-6 pixels in these artifacts would result in 100% prediction confidence by the target classifier. Hence, we claim that such artifacts exist as the GAN struggles for the adversarial objective. However, we believe that these artifacts are subject to further reduction.
D. CLASSIFIER ATTENTION STUDY FOR CIFAR-10 IMAGES
We speculate that the blurs and artifacts in the CIFAR-10 adversaries are, to certain extent, also essential in fooling the target classifier (same in spirit to our argument made regarding MNIST adversaries). However, it is difficult to conduct an ablation of these artifacts given the complexity of the CIFAR-10 images and the perturbation vectors. Instead, we consider the attention of the target classifier. We leverage the class activation mapping [73] where a class activation map (CAM) manifests the most discriminative regions in the image. In other words, a CAM suggests where the classifier is looking at when making the prediction. We obtain the CAMs for pairs of benign images and their adversarial counterparts (see Fig.17 ). We denote the 10 images from left to right by ''Image 1'' to ''Image 10''. Red area indicates higher attention region, whereas greenish and blue area indicates medium and low attention region.
We observe that the added perturbations cause slight changes in the attention made by the target classifier. For instance, the high and medium attention regions of Image 1 have shrunk to exclude the lower bottom parts (tail, thigh and hip) of the dog. This can be explained by considering the perturbation made to Image 1 (refer to Fig.9 ): as the most significant perturbations are made in the trunk region of the dog, the classifier shrinks its focus to the trunk to give a false classification. Similarly, the medium attention region of Image 9 drifts up to include certain part of the sky -possibly a consequence of the artifacts added to that location. The high attention region shifts slightly upwards, covering the vertical tail and the main body of the airplane. We can verify the significant amount of noise added to these locations from Fig.9 . As another example, the high attention regions of both Image 6 and Image 7 grow slightly -the extended regions again align with the perturbation pattern added.
Our study shows that the added perturbations, including the tiling artifacts, play an important role in guiding the attention of the target classifier, thereby deceiving it into FIGURE 19. Sample adversaries generated by the Natural Adversary attack [71] . Top: raw images each belonging to one of the 10 classes. Middle: corresponding adversaries generated for raw images by FGSM. Bottom: corresponding adversaries generated by the Natural Adversary attack. The target model is a LeNet classifier. The prediction is indicated at the top-left corner for each image. (figures reproduced from [71] ).
giving the wrong predictions. When considering the CAMs for adversaries by FGSM and AdvGAN (see Fig.18 ), where the perturbations are made in a much more unconstrained way, we observe noticeable resemblance between their attention patterns (despite discrepancies at certain locations). This implies that various methods somewhat share the same key pixels which need to be altered to achieve the adversarial goal. Nevertheless, attacks that cause more pervasive noise such as FGSM and AdvGAN alter these more important pixels at the inevitable cost of also modifying many less relevant pixels in the meanwhile.
E. RELATED WORK
We mention several other works that can be related to our method. To the best of our knowledge, they are the only GAN-based attack methods in the literature. Our architecture adopts an image-to-image translation model that resembles the ones used in [24] , [75] and hence our generator is structure-wise similar to the one used by AdvGAN [64] . However, the high-level architectures, and hence the perturbation patterns, of both methods are entirely disparate as our method eliminates the input-perturbation superposition step. Other GAN-based work that adopt similar architectures to AdvGAN are [20] and [67] , both of which use CGAN and noise z to drive the generator. Both methods do not outperform AdvGAN in terms of output realism.
In terms of perturbation patterns, our method is most similar to [71] . Intriguingly, the two methods adopt substantially distinct approaches. While [71] also employs a GAN, the generator G takes as input a Gaussian noise z to generate the adversary x . Noticeably, they also train an inverter network I to map a raw input x back to a latent vector z . The entire network is then trained to minimise the distance between G(z ) and x, as well as the distance between z and I (x ) (see Fig. 19 ). Moreover, they propose iterative search algorithms to compute perturbations made onto z to fool the target model (refer to their original paper for more details). Essentially, both methods combine the two processes of image reconstruction from latent vectors and target network fooling. We believe this is the reason behind the similar, semantically-strong perturbations by both methods. The difference lies in that [71] explicitly searches for the optimal z to fulfill the fooling objective, whereas our GAN objective function implicitly FIGURE 20. AdvGAN architecture (adopted from [64] ).
FIGURE 21.
Natural Adversary architecture (adopted from [71] ).
allows learning of the desired latent vector. Nonetheless, adversaries by their method exhibit large deviations from the raw images where many digits (e.g. ''2'', ''4'', ''6'', ''0'') are largely transformed into a different digits(see Fig.19 ). The attack capability of their method is unclear as relevant results are absent in their work. To the best of our knowledge, the above studied works are the only ones that employ GAN for adversary generation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we proposed a new architecture for generating adversarial examples. Different from almost all existing attack algorithms, our proposed image-to-image translation network performs one-shot adversaries generation without intermediate perturbation vectors. We show that our proposed architecture generates distinct perturbation patterns to those by other popular attack methods in the literature. Our method achieves competitive results on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets in terms of visual realism and attack speed.
Finally, we hope that our work will motivate more research in the area of GAN-based adversarial attack. As there is a huge potential to be explored in the image-to-image translation adversary generation, we hope that our preliminary work on this novel idea can draw more research attention and efforts on the topic.
APPENDIX A ARCHITECTURE OF GAN-BASED ATTACKS
See Figs. 20 and 21.
APPENDIX B NOTATIONS FOR DNN ARCHITECTURE DESCRIPTIONS
• Conv(m, k × k, s): convolutional layer with m feature maps, filter size k × k and stride size s.
• MaxPool(k × k): max pooling layer with filter size k × k and default stride size 1.
• AveragePool(k × k): average pooling layer with filter size k × k and default stride size 1.
• FC(n): fully-connected layer with n outputs VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 22. t-SNE embeddings for CIFAR-10 images. We plot the 3D t-SNE embedding to better display the spatial relationship among clusters of different classes. Colour codes are consistent in all images.
• Dropout(p): dropout layer with probability p • ReLU: Rectified Linear Unit activation • Softmax: softmax layer whose output dimension is the same as the input dimension
• BN: Batch normalisation [23] • ResBlock(m, k × k, s): residual block built upon convolutional layers of Conv(m, k × k, s). The exact configuration is different in our work and is elucidated in the context (see Fig.5 ).
APPENDIX C T-SNE EMBEDDINGS FOR CIFAR-10 IMAGES
See Fig. 22 .
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